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Type-Ambiguous Names
Anders J. Schoubye
— forthcoming in Mind
The orthodox view of proper names, Millianism, provides a very simple and elegant expla-
nation of the semantic contribution (and semantic properties) of referential uses of names,
namely names that occur as bare singulars and as the argument of a predicate. However, one
problem for Millianism is that it cannot explain the semantic contribution of predicative uses
of names (as in e.g. ’there are two Alberts in my class’). In recent years, an alternative view, so-
called The–Predicativism, has become increasingly popular. According to The–Predicativists,
names are uniformly count nouns. This straightforwardly explains why names can be used
predicatively, but is prima facie less congenial to an analysis of referential uses. To address
this issue, The–Predicativists argue that referential names are in fact complex determiner
phrases consisting of a covert definite determiner and a count noun—and so, a referential
name is a (covert) definite description. In this paper, I will argue that despite the appearance
of increased theoretical complexity, the view that names are ambiguous between predicative
and referential types is in fact superior to the unitary The–Predicativist view. However, I will
also argue that to see why this (type) ambiguity view is better, we need to give up the standard
Millian analysis. Consequently, I will first propose an alternative analysis of referential names
that (a) retains the virtues of Millianism, but (b) provides an important explanatory connection
to the predicative uses. Once this analysis of names is adopted, the explanation for why names
are systematically ambiguous between referential and predicative types is both simple and
elegant. Second, I will argue that The–Predicativism has the appearance of being simpler than
an ambiguity view, but is in fact unable to account for certain key properties of referential
names without making ad hoc stipulations.
1 Introduction: Referential and Predicative Names
Today, the orthodox semantic analysis of proper names is Millianism, the core thesis
of which is that a proper name is a singular term whose semantic contribution to
propositional content is simply its referent.1 So, if a name N occurs in a sentence S,
the semantic contribution of N to the proposition expressed by S is just the referent
of N. In addition to this core thesis, contemporary Millians generally endorse the
related theses listed in T2–T5 below.2 ‘Millianism’, as I will use the term here, refers
to the conjunction of T1–T5.
1Cf. Kripke (1979, 1980), Kaplan (1989b,a), Salmon (1986, 1990), and Soames (1987, 2002).
2I should note that T2 and T3 are consequences of T1. That is, once one accepts the thesis
that the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent, it then follows that the name is rigid
and directly referential. These are however importantly different properties and I thus list
them separately. The term ’Millianism’ was first, I believe, introduced by Kripke (1979, 1) and
it is meant to to pay tribute to Mill (1843).
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T1 ∣ Core Millianism
A proper name is a singular term, semantic type e, and its semantic contribu-
tion to propositional content is simply its referent.
T2 ∣ Direct Reference
The relation between name and referent is direct, that is, the reference of a
name is not mediated by any propositional constituent.
T3 ∣ Rigidity
The reference of a name is modally stable, that is the name refers to the same
individual in every possible world. For example, the name ‘Gödel’ refers to
Gödel even in counterfactual scenarios where Gödel is not called ‘Gödel’ or
where Gödel is not a famous logician.3
T4 ∣ Fixity
The semantic value of a name cannot be affected by logical operators such
as modal or temporal operators. Hence, if a name occurs within the scope
of a modal, the modal cannot shift the reference of the name. In short, the
semantic value of a name is fixed.4
T5 ∣ Ambiguity
An expression such as ‘Paul’ can be to used refer to different individuals
on different occasions. The reason is, however, not that ‘Paul’ is a context-
sensitive expression, but rather that this phonological string is lexically am-
biguous. For each individual called Paul, there is thus a corresponding (and
distinct) lexical entry. Each of these lexical entries are simply morphologically
identical homonyms.5
Millianism provides a straightforward explanation of the semantic contribution
of bare singular names in argument position of a predicate, i.e. names as they occur
in sentences such as (1)–(3).
(1) Paul is a linguist.
(2) Paul must read Montague.
3Two kinds of rigidity are occasionally distinguished, namely ‘persistent’ and ‘obstinate’
rigidity, cf. Salmon (1981, 32-41). A name is obstinately rigid if it refers to the same individual
in all possible worlds, even worlds where that individual does not exist. By contrast, a name
is persistently rigid if it refers to the same individual in all worlds where the individual exists
(and fails to refer in worlds where that individual does not exist). Nothing in my discussion
hangs on the choice between these notions, so I remain neutral on this issue here.
4I refer to this kind of immunity to shifting as ‘Fixity’ following Schlenker (2003, 29).
5For arguments in favor of the lexical ambiguity view, cf. Kripke (1980, 7-9), Kaplan (1989b,
558-563), Kaplan (1990), and Soames (2002, 96-103).
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(3) If Paul sent Paul a book last year, Alfred should have received it by now.
It seems intuitively correct that the semantic contributions of the names in
(1)–(3) are simply the referents, and moreover that the names are directly referential,
rigid, and fixed. For ease of exposition, I will refer to bare singular uses of proper
names in argument position of a predicate as referential uses, or sometimes simply
as referential names.6
However, like common count nouns, proper names can combine syntactically
with a wide range of determiners, e.g. definite and indefinite determiners, numerical
determiners, demonstratives, and wh-phrases. These uses of names, namely uses
where the name occurs as the syntactic sister of a determiner, are standardly referred
to as predicative uses (I will sometimes simply use the term predicative name for these
occurrences).7 For example, consider (4)–(12).
(4) There are relatively few Alfreds in Princeton. (Burge, 1973, 429)
(5) A Smith is in the kitchen. Another is in the garden.
(Hawthorne and Manley, 2012, 219)
(6) Three Alfreds asked questions during the lecture.
(7) The Alfred who joined the club today was a baboon. (Burge, 1973, 429)
(8) Every Sarah I’ve met sometimes works as a babysitter. (Fara, 2015b, 61)
(9) Most Alfreds are crazy. (Elbourne, 2005, 171)
(10) Do you mean this Alfred? (Elbourne, 2005, 171)
(11) Which Alfred do you mean? (Elbourne, 2005, 171)
(12) Sarahs from Alaska are usually scary. (Fara, 2015b, 61)
One problem for Millianism is that there is no straightforward way of reconciling
the intuitive truth conditions of the sentences in (4)–(12) with the assumptions in
T1–T5. In other words, predicative uses of names are not, it would seem, consistent
with an analysis of names as directly referential, rigid, and fixed singular terms.
1.1 Predicativism
One alternative to Millianism is Predicativism. This is the view that proper names are
uniformly predicative, i.e. the contribution of a name to propositional content is a
predicate. So, the meaning of the name ‘Paul’ might be the property of being called
6This is merely terminological convenience, and hence not meant to prejudge either seman-
tic function or semantic properties of these names.
7I mean to include cases here where a name is part of a larger syntactic constituent which
is the sister of a determiner, cf. e.g. (7) and (8) below. Proper names also have bare plural uses,
cf. (12).
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Paul, the property of bearing the name ‘Paul’, or some such variant. Moreover,
when a name is used referentially, the name is typically analysed as shorthand for
some complex determiner phrase, e.g. ‘The person called Paul’ (e.g. Kneale, 1960),
‘That Paul’ (e.g. Burge, 1973), ‘The thing which is the bearer of ‘Paul” (e.g. Katz,
2001), ‘The Paul’ (e.g. Sloat, 1969).8
One Predicativist view that seems to be gaining popularity is The–Predicativism.9
Proponents of this view, namely Elbourne (2005), Matushansky (2006, 2008), and
Fara (2011, 2015a,b) argue that names are count nouns. So, just as the count noun
‘tiger’ denotes a property, a name such as ‘Paul’ also denotes a property, namely
the property loosely characterised by the function λx: x ∈ De . x is called Paul.10
This analysis of names makes it straightforward to explain predicative uses, i.e.
why names can occur as the syntactic arguments of quantificational determiners,
cf. the sentences in (4)–(12), and it also makes it easy to explain why names have
bare plural, i.e. generic, uses. In addition, proponents of The–Predicativism provide
several other convincing semantic and syntactic arguments for the claim that names
should be analysed as predicates. To give just one example, Matushansky and Fara
provide ample evidence that contrary to immediate appearances, the verb ‘call’ is
not ditransitive (i.e. does not have three argument places) in constructions such as
(13) below.
(13) My parents called me Delia. (Fara, 2015b, 67)
Instead it is a transitive verb whose direct object is a so-called small clause, viz.
the clause ‘me Delia’ in (13). Within this small clause, ‘me’ is in subject position and
‘Delia’ is in what is syntactically predicate position. In other words, the name ‘Delia’
is a predicate in (13), cf. Matushansky (2005) and Fara (2011, 2015b) for details.
What sets The–Predicativism apart from other Predicativist views is that propo-
nents of The–Predicativism maintain that when a proper name occurs in argument
position of a predicate and as a bare singular, cf. (1)–(3) above, the proper name is in
fact the syntactic argument of a covert and phonologically null, i.e. unpronounced,
definite determiner. In other words, the logical form (LF) of a sentence such as (1) is
roughly (14), cf. Fara (2015b, 70-71).
8Predicativism is sometimes distinguished from so-called ‘Metalinguistic Descriptivism’,
but I use the term here as a general term for a family of related views. Early proponents of
Predicativism include Quine (1960), Kneale (1960), Sloat (1969), and Burge (1973), but in the last
two decades, it has been defended in various forms by several other people including Hornsby
(1976), Bach (1981, 1987, 2002), Geurts (1997), Katz (2001), Elbourne (2005), Matushansky (2006,
2008), Sawyer (2010), Fara (2011, 2015a,b), and Gray (2014). See also Larson and Segal (1995).
9Since there are important differences between Elbourne’s, Matushansky’s, and Fara’s
views, the following characterisation of The–Predicativism leaves out a number of details.
However, when details are relevant, I will include these.
10I use the notation standard from Heim and Kratzer (1998). In an expression of the form⌜λα: N . M⌝, α is an argument variable, N is a domain condition indicating the domain of the
function and M is a value description.
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(1) Paul is a linguist.
(14) [S [DP ∅the Paul] [VP is a linguist]] S: t
DP VP: ⟨et⟩
D NP: ⟨et⟩ is a linguist
∅the N
Paul
In a standard extensional semantics (and assuming a Fregean referential analysis
of definite descriptions), the truth conditions of (1) are thus to be derived as follows:
the proper name ‘Paul’ in (1) is a predicate that combines compositionally with the
covert definite determiner to form a referential expression of semantic type e. This
referential expression then combines with the VP to form an expression of type t.11
This demonstrates one of the primary selling points of The–Predicativism and
perhaps its most significant advantage over Millianism, namely that it provides a
uniform and compositional analysis of names that can provide an explanation for
both predicative and referential uses.12
1.2 Type Ambiguity
Faced with the problem of predicative uses, it might seem that there is an obvious
and simple solution to this problem that proponents of Millianism could endorse.
The Millian could, for example, argue that the phonological string ‘Paul’ is not
only lexically ambiguous (i.e. that there are multiple homonyms of ‘Paul’ in the
lexicon), but moreover that each individual homonym is ambiguous between a
directly referential singular term (referring to a specific individual) and a predicate
(expressing the property of being called Paul). This would thus amount to the view
11As noted by a referee for this journal, whether to treat the definite article as a function from
properties to individuals is independent of the Predicativist thesis that names are predicates.
Predicativism is perfectly compatible with a Russellian analysis of ‘the’ where it is a genuine
quantificational determiner, viz. semantic type ⟨et,⟨et,t⟩⟩, cf. e.g. Neale (1990), and an analysis
of ‘the’ as a predicate modifier, viz. semantic type ⟨et,et⟩, see Fara (2001). Predicativists such
as Elbourne (2005) and Matushansky (2008) both favour the Fregean analysis.
12Millianism and Predicativism obviously do not exhaust the space of possible views about
proper names. There is, for example, a variety of other famous descriptivist view, e.g. Frege’s
(1892) sense theory, Russell’s (1905, 1956) ‘famous deeds’ descriptivism, Searle’s (1958) cluster
theory of names, and others. However, since The–Predicativism is becoming increasingly
popular (and since I take it to be the most empirically adequate of the non-Millian views), I
restrict my focus to this view here.
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that names come in two different types, a referential type and a predicative type.
While this analysis would entail that names are both lexically ambiguous and type
ambiguous, it could also salvage Millianism for the referential uses of names.13
Henceforth, I will refer to the view that name have two distinct types, namely a
referential type and predicative type, as the type-ambiguity view. This view, I should
emphasise, is compatible with different analyses of referential and predicative
names respectively, it just assumes that names invariantly come in these two types.14
So someone who endorses Millianism for referential names can simultaneously
endorse the type ambiguity theory and this might seem like the simplest and most
obvious way for a proponent of Millianism to account for predicative names. The
problem is that there are a number of significant explanatory challenges for this
view, e.g. (E1)–(E3) below.15
Inferential Patterns (E1)
It is natural to think that some important relation holds between the meaning of
a referential name and the meaning of its predicative counterpart. In particular,
one might think that this relation in meaning is what explains why any normal
utterance of e.g. ‘Jones is a Jones’ (Burge, 1973, 429) seems obviously true or more
generally why certain inferences involving referential and predicative names are, at
least intuitively, instances of perfectly good reasoning. Consider, for example, the
inferences below:
Paul is tired
IF1
So, at least one Paul is tired
No Pauls are tired
IF2
So, Paul is not tired
While the inferences in IF1 and IF2 are not necessarily truth preserving (and thus not
valid in the sense of being true at every world in every model), there is nevertheless
something intuitively compelling about these inferences.16 For instance, they seem
13This is, roughly, the view defended by Leckie (2013). More specifically, Leckie argues that
names are polysemous between referential and predicative uses.
14Some complain that what I call type-ambiguity is really polysemy. This is mostly a termi-
nological dispute. I use the expression type-ambiguity for two reasons. First, I find that the
notion of polysemy is rather inclusive and often extended to phenomena that I consider quite
disparate, e.g. so-called deferred reference and predicate transfer, cf. Nunberg (1995). Second,
the type of meaning difference that I am arguing is systematically observable with names is
more reminiscent of the type of meaning difference observed in ‘and’—famously referred to
as ‘type-ambiguity’ by Partee and Rooth (1983). Lastly, on the view that I am advocating, the
lexicon would contain one entry for a referential name and a distinct entry for the predicate.
15These challenges are explicated in detail and discussed by Leckie (2013, 1143ff), however
the challenge in E1 was, I believe, first observed by Hornsby (1976, 228-229). I use Leckie’s
terminology for several of these challenges.
16Since validity is standardly explicated as truth in all worlds of every model, notice that
there might be possible worlds where Paul is tired, but where he is not called Paul.
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to satisfy the following intuitively plausible constraint on good inferences:
For any context c, if the premise(s) can be uttered truly in c, the conclu-
sion must be true in c.17
To illustrate, consider IF1: If a speaker can truly utter ‘Paul is tired’ in a given
context, it intuitively follows that at least one Paul is tired in that context.18
For proponents of The–Predicativism, explaining why IF1 and IF2 satisfy the
constraint above is not a problem—it follows directly from their analysis of bare
singular names in argument position of a predicate. On this analysis, the name
‘Paul’ in the premise of IF1 combines with a phonologically null definite determiner
yielding a definite description of the form ‘the Paul’. That description can refer to
an individual x only if x is called Paul, and as a result the premise is predicted to be
true iff the (unique) individual called Paul is tired. This premise can thus obviously
be true in a context only if the conclusion is too.
By contrast, if a proponent of Millianism avails herself of the type-ambiguity
view to account for the predicative uses, inferences such as IF1 and IF2 constitute a
non-trivial challenge. On the Millian view, the content of the name in the premise
of IF1 is just its referent, i.e. it is not part of the semantics of the name that its
referent must be called Paul. Hence, to explain why e.g. IF1 seems to satisfy the
condition above, viz. that whenever its premise can be uttered truly, the conclusion
must be true too, the Millian cannot appeal to the semantics of the name. As
a consequence, the Millian must maintain that something else explains why IF1
seems intuitively to satisfy this condition. The question, of course, is what exactly
this something else is? On the one hand, it cannot be part of the meaning of the
name (nor, I presume, part of the meaning of the predicate), so it would have to
be something that goes beyond the meaning of the constituents and their truth
conditional composition, viz. something non-semantic. On the other hand, it must
be something that can constrain when the premise can be uttered truly. However,
something that constrains the conditions under which a sentence can be uttered
truly seems to constrain the truth conditions more generally. So such a constraint
is presumably a semantic constraint (i.e. a constraint on the meaning of the name)?
There is, therefore, a genuine challenge for Millians quite generally, namely how to
explain that these inferences are intuitively compelling without appealing to any
semantic relation between referential and predicative names.
17While this principle is formulated in terms of utterances, we should distinguish between
utterances and saentences-in-a-context. As Kaplan (1989b, 522) notes: ‘[...] it is important to
distinguish an utterance from a sentence-in-a-context. The former notion is from the theory
of speech acts, the latter from semantics. Utterances take time, and utterances of distinct
sentences cannot be simultaneous (i.e., in the same context). But in order to develop a logic of
demonstratives we must be able to evaluate several premises and a conclusion all in the same
context.’ (Kaplan, 1989b, 522). Hence, the relevant notion here is really sentences-in-a-context.
18On the assumption that the determiner phrase ‘No Fs’ can only be used appropriately
when the domain of Fs is non-empty, IF2 would also intuitively satisfy this constraint.
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Here is an explanation that I suspect a Millian might propose in response: While
it is not part of the meaning of ‘Paul’, it is a constraint on its use that it can only
refer to individuals called Paul. So, it is only possible to truly utter the sentence
‘Paul is tired’ in a context c if the intended referent is called Paul in c.
The problem with this suggestion is that it is difficult not to take this constraint
on the use of ‘Paul’ as part of its meaning (i.e. its semantics). Since, on this explana-
tion, the constraint directly determines what the name can be used to refer to, and
so directly impacts the truth conditions of any utterance that contains the name, this
looks like a semantic constraint. So, if that explanation is correct, there is something
to the meaning of a name over and above its referent—and this then is no longer
the standard Millian view.
Competence (E2)
Linguistic competence with referential and predicative names appears to be closely
connected. For example, if a speaker understands the meaning of a bare singular
name (i.e. a referential name), that speaker would under normal circumstances also
understand the meaning of its predicative counterpart. In other words, a speaker
who understands (15) is also typically capable of understanding (16).
(15) Paul is tired.
(16) There is at least one Paul who is tired.
Again, an explanation of this competence follows directly from The–Predicativism:
If names are uniformly predicates, there is then no semantic difference between the
names in (15) and (16). In contrast, providing an adequate explanation of this com-
petence is less straightforward if it is assumed that the meaning of the name in (15)
is exhausted by its referent. Indeed, it seems natural to assume that any adequate
explanation of the observation about competence must rely on the meaning, i.e. the
semantics, of the names, but such an explanation is not immediately available to the
Millian who also endorses the view that names are ambiguous between referential
and predicative meanings. Hence, with regards to competence, it also seems that
there is a prima facie challenge for this view.
Intra and Cross-Linguistic Uniformity (E3)
Finally, if names are ambiguous between predicative and non-predicative kinds, this
would mean that certain languages have a rather staggering number of ambiguities.
For example, in English, it seems that all names have both predicative and referential
uses (Intra-linguistic Uniformity). In addition, both referential and predicative uses
of names are attested in a variety of other languages (Cross-linguistic Uniformity).
The question for a proponent of the type-ambiguity view is what explains
this kind of uniformity both language internally and across languages. If names are
genuinely type-ambiguous, would it then just have to be a massive coincidence that
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this ambiguity is cross-linguistically ubiquitous? That seems very implausible. In
contrast, it seems that proponents of The–Predicativism completely avoid the need
to address these potential problems as names are simply not ambiguous according
to their view.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the type-ambiguity view (with referential names construed as Millian
names) faces some non-trivial challenges and it is unclear how to adequately resolve
these challenges while maintaining T1-T5 above for referential names. So, this does
not look like an easy way out. On the other hand, sticking to the assumption that
all occurrences of names are invariantly Millian just leaves it entirely mysterious
how to explain the widely attested predicative uses.
In contrast, The–Predicativism provides direct and elegant solutions to these
challenges, so one might be tempted to conclude that The–Predicativism has the
advantage here.19
However, before proceeding to my proposed analysis, let’s first quickly sum-
marise the three positions considered so far.
▸ (Strict) Millianism (names as uniformly singular terms)
Proper names are uniformly directly referential singular terms, semantic type
e, and the meaning of a name is simply its referent. Moreover, proper names
are directly referential, rigid, fixed, and lexically ambiguous. Seemingly non-
Millian uses of names (e.g. various predicative uses) must either be explained
away or, somehow, be explained in terms of the relevant singular terms.
▸ Predicativism (names as uniformly predicates)
Proper names are uniformly predicative, semantic type ⟨e,t⟩, and the meaning
of a name ‘N’ is roughly the property λx: x ∈ De . x is called N. Bare singular
uses of names must be explained as derived from, or piggybacking on, the
predicational uses.
▸ Type-Ambiguity (names as systematically ambiguous)
Proper names are type-ambiguous between expressions denoting individuals
19One response on behalf of the Millian is given by Leckie (2013) who argues that Millians
can meet these challenges by appealing to the general phenomena of metonymy. Moreover,
Leckie also argues that to explain metonymic relations, both lexical rules and pragmatics
are needed and such lexical rules and pragmatics suffice to bridge the putative gap between
Millian names and predicative names. Leckie’s view is interesting and ultimately, for the
purposes of this paper, I am willing to grant that for proponents of Millianism (as characterised
by T1–T5 above), Leckie’s proposal may be the best option. My proposed view shares some
similarities with Leckie’s view, but I will argue that there is a simpler and theoretically more
elegant way of meeting these challenges that will not require any auxiliary assumptions about
metonymic relations or lexical rules and which will have additional explanatory power. That
option is to adopt the semantics of referential names that I propose in the following sections.
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(e.g. singular terms) and expressions denoting properties (e.g. predicates).
For example, one might propose to be Millian about referential names but
Predicativist about the predicative uses of names. The challenges in E1–E3
arise for proponents of this latter view.20
1.3 Thesis: A Defense of Type-Ambiguous Names
The thesis to be defended in the present paper is the following: Proper names are
type-ambiguous—more specifically ambiguous between predicates and singular
terms. The semantic type of a predicative name is the same as the type of a count
noun, viz. type ⟨e,t⟩ in a simple extensional semantic framework. In contrast, when
a name occurs grammatically as a bare singular, it is an individual-denoting singular
term and therefore semantic type e. I will henceforth indicate name types using
superscripts: ‘PaulP’ for the predicative type and ‘PaulR’ for the referential type.
Instead of adopting and defending the orthodox Millian analysis for referential
names, I will present an alternative that retains the primary virtues of Millianism,
but also provides a number of additional advantages. One specific advantage is that
referential names and predicative names turn out to share a crucial piece of semantic
content. This shared content will suffice to resolve the challenges discussed above.
In other words, I will show that there are very strong reasons for favoring the
type-ambiguity view. Moreover, my arguments will show that the ambiguity in
question is benign, i.e. it does not add gratuitous theoretical complexity. As regards
theoretical parsimony, the type-ambiguity view is, at the very least, on a par with
The–Predicativism.
In the second half of the present paper, I will argue that The–Predicativism,
despite being the most promising Predicativist view, faces significant problems.
First, I will demonstrate that proponents of The–Predicativism have no resources
to provide a principled explanation of the rigidity of proper names. Second, I will
demonstrate that the behaviour of definite descriptions in English is inconsistent
with the behaviour of names in argument position of a predicate. In other words, the
assumption that names are covert descriptions leaves several serious explanatory
gaps. These problems show that the uniform analysis offered by The–Predicativism
comes with considerable costs. So, as far as theoretical parsimony is concerned, the
type-ambiguity view is superior.
2 Two Types of Names: Predicates and Pronouns
Let us start by considering the syntax and semantics of predicative names.
20However, proponents of strict Millianism are obviously no better off. On this view there
simply is no explanation of predicative uses.
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PREDICATIVE NAMES
Predicative names, let’s assume, are just like count nouns: Semantically these
names denote properties, i.e. functions from individuals to truth values, and their
(extensional) semantic type is therefore ⟨e,t⟩. To a rough approximation, the lexical
entry for a predicative name, e.g. ‘Paul’, is the following:
(17) JPaulPKc,g,w = λx: x ∈ De . x is called Paul in w21
As mentioned already, when predicative names are analysed as count nouns, this
straightforwardly explains why it is possible for names to combine with quantifi-
cational determiners as illustrated by examples (4)–(12) above. Finally, like other
count nouns, e.g. ‘bears’ in (18), predicative names also have bare plural uses. This
explains why names can be used to make generic statements, cf. e.g. (19).
(18) Bears from Alaska are dangerous.
(19) Sarahs from Alaska are dangerous.
In short, I propose to analyze this particular class of names (viz. the predicative
names) in the way roughly suggested by proponents of The–Predicativism. How-
ever, since I think that there are non-trivial problems with The–Predicativism, there
are good reasons to suppose that referential names are of a different type.
REFERENTIAL NAMES
Rather than the Millian analysis of names as individual-denoting constants whose
meanings are simply the referents, I propose an alternative analysis. I propose that
referential names, i.e. names that occur as bare singulars in argument position of a
predicate, be analysed as expressions that can refer to different individuals across
contexts and whose semantic values are determined by a contextually determined
variable assignment rather than a model theoretic interpretation function. On
my proposed analysis, a proper name is thus formally a variable rather than an
individual-denoting constant. In slogan form, a proper name is a pronoun.22
21A more sophisticated formulation of the naming relation is most likely needed, but
there is some disagreement even among proponents of The–Predicativism on this issue, cf.
Matushansky (2008, 592f) for extensive discussion. I use the perhaps naive ‘x is called N’ in this
paper, but nothing in my analysis hangs on this assumption. I simply leave it to proponents
of The–Predicativism to determine which analysis and formulation of the naming relation
is empirically superior. Whichever is deemed superior, I will use that condition both in my
analysis of predicative names and in my analysis of referential names, cf. section 2.2
22There are several important predecessors to the view that I am defending here. First,
an early and closely related analysis is Recanati (1993, 135-146), where proper names are
analysed as a type of indexical with corresponding descriptive characters. Also, Lasersohn
(forthcoming), in a currently unpublished manuscript, has proposed an analysis of names
that is very similar to my proposal here. However, neither Recanati nor Lasersohn discuss
nor relate their analyses to the problems raised here. Moreover, general proposals to analyse
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Analysing referential names as pronouns allows one to retain the most desirable
features of Millanism but also provides additional advantages including a quite
elegant way of bridging the putative gap between referential and predicative names.
However, to make clear the intended analysis of proper names envisioned here, we
need to start by outlining the semantics of pronouns.
2.1 Pronouns
According to the now widely considered standard analysis of pronouns in Heim
and Kratzer (1998, 239-260)—building on Cooper (1983, 176-194)—a pronoun is a
numerically indexed expression whose semantic value is a function of a variable
assignment g (where g is a function from numbers to individuals in the domain of
the relevant model). The variable assignment is generally assumed to be a function
of the discourse context and can informally be thought of as a model of the speakers’
intentions. While variable assignments determine semantic values of pronouns,
there are important constraints on such assignments. For example, a pronoun
‘she’ can have an individual d as its semantic value only if d is female (gender), a
single individual (number), and neither the speaker nor the addressee (person).
These constraints on assignments correspond to grammatically represented features
standardly called φ-features—for pronouns in English these are gender, number,
and person features.23
φ-features are often assumed, see e.g. Heim and Kratzer (1998, 244-245) and
Heim (2008, 35-37), to be syntactically realised with each φ-feature occupying an
names as variables have been around for a while, see especially Dever (1998) and more
recently Cumming (2008). There are, however, important differences between these proposals
and mine—most obviously that my proposed analysis includes a crucial constraint on the
assignment of semantic values to proper names. Moreover, Cumming, for example, insists
(for reasons that are unclear to me) that names are not context-sensitive and I explicitly reject
this assumption. Another view that deserves mentioning is Charlow (2013), especially p.516-
517. Charlow’s analysis assumes that names trigger existence presuppositions that provide
information about the relation between name and referent. While Charlow’s analysis is not
exactly an analysis of names as variables, his analysis does have more resources than standard
Millianism, for example resources to deal with e.g. E1 discussed earlier. However, Charlow’s
analysis also has the consequence that proper names should have straightforward attributive
uses which they do not. I discuss this issue in more detail later. Finally, a couple of recent
papers (that only came to my attention after the writing this paper) that present proposals
with certain similarities to the view defended here, see Rami (2014) and Delgado (2015).
It is also sometimes argued that the view that proper names are variables or pronouns is
very close in nature to the analysis of names in various versions of dynamic semantics, e.g.
Discourse Representation Theory, cf. Kamp and Reyle (1993), Asher (1986), van der Sandt
(1992). I think this is a rather subtle issue and it is not something that I wish to discuss here.
However, as I am myself an advocate of dynamic semantics, cf. Schoubye (2011, 2013), and
since my view is perfectly compatible with various dynamic systems, I am more than happy
to include various dynamic semantic approaches as precursors to the view defended here.
23For an extended discussion of the syntax and semantics of φ-features, see Heim (2008).
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individual node in a phrase structure, cf. the phrase structure below. Semantically,
these features are treated as partial identity functions f and they are defined only if
the individual d, determined by g, is in the domain of f. If d satisfies the relevant
domain constraint associated with f, the output of the function is simply d. If not,
semantic computation comes to a halt and no proposition is expressed. In short, φ-
features represent a type of presuppositional constraint on assignments of semantic
values to pronouns, cf. (21)–(23).
(20) JsheiKc,g,w = g(i) DP
[3rd person] DP
[feminine] DP
[singular] DP
shei
(21) J3rd personK = λx : x ∈ De and x is neither the
speaker nor the addressee in wc . x
(22) JfeminineK = λx : x ∈ De and x is female in wc . x
(23) JsingularK = λx : x ∈ De and x is singular in wc . x
From a semantic point of view, these syntactic assumptions about φ-features are
not strictly required. For example, one could instead assume the φ-features are not
syntactically realised but simply included directly in the semantics of pronouns.
For example, consider (24).
(24)
JsheiKc,w,g = g(i) if g(i) is a single individual in wc
g(i) is female in wc
g(i) is not speaker nor addressee in wc
= undefined otherwise
This explication of φ-features can easily be generalised to other pronouns and it
yields equivalent semantic results with less syntactic commitments.
This analysis of pronouns is very similar to Kaplan’s (1989b, 1989a) analysis. In
a sense, the Kaplanian notion of character is here captured in terms of φ-features.
Kaplanian characters are roughly speaking linguistic rules associated with expres-
sions and these rules are, for Kaplan, determinants of semantic values in context
(although not part of the propositional content). For instance, the character of ‘you’
is something like the addressee in the context of utterance which relative to such
a context determines an individual. On the view proposed here, this character
would be encoded as a presuppositional constraint on uses of ‘you’, i.e. such uses
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are predicted to be acceptable only if the intended referent, determined by the
variable assignment, has the property of being the addressee of the utterance in the
context.24
As in Kaplan’s original analysis, this analysis renders pronouns directly referen-
tial, rigid, and fixed. Firstly, since the semantic value of a pronoun is determined
directly by a variable assignment, its semantic value is not mediated by a proposi-
tional constituent (direct reference). Secondly, if a sentence S contains a pronoun
α that refers to b relative to context c, then if the proposition expressed by S in c
is evaluated relative to different possible worlds, the reference of α is b at every
possible world (rigidity). Thirdly, since the assignment function is what determines
the semantic value of the name, its reference can only be shifted (i.e. changed) by
logical operators that operate on variable assignments. Since modal and temporal
operators operate on world and time parameters, names cannot be shifted by such
operators (fixity). In conclusion, names are directly referential, rigid, and fixed.25
Another important feature of this analysis is that it treats pronouns as context-
sensitive rather than as lexically ambiguous. Standard examples of lexical ambiguity
in English include ‘bat’, ‘strike’, ‘case’, etc. For example, ‘bat’ can be used to talk
about a winged nocturnal animal or a piece of sporting equipment, but these mean-
ings are unrelated and moreover expressed by different words in other languages.
It is therefore generally assumed that these meanings are also expressed by different
words in English—words that as a matter of mere coincidence are homonyms. So,
while the string ‘bat’, can refer to at least two unrelated types of things, these things
are in fact referred to by different words, e.g. ‘bat1’ and ‘bat2’, and these words have
different characters.
In contrast, that a pronoun such as ‘she’ can be used to refer to different individ-
uals is not intuitively a good reason to conclude that ‘she’ is multiply ambiguous,
i.e. that the lexicon contains ‘she1’, ‘she2’ ... ‘shen’. Pronouns are sensitive to context
in a way that lexically ambiguous words are not. So, when the word ‘she’ is used to
24In other words, φ-features are not exactly like characters. On the Kaplanian view, character
plus context determine semantic value whereas φ-features only constrain what semantic value
an expression can be assigned given a context. However, for my purposes, this difference
between Heim and Kratzer’s analysis and Kaplan’s analysis is of no concern.
25Pronouns can, however, be ‘shifted’ by quantificational determiners. Indeed, if a pronoun
is co-indexed with a quantifier, the quantifier is generally assumed to shift the variable
assignment to a modified assignment, cf. Heim and Kratzer (1998) for details. This follows
from the standard Tarskian semantics for quantifiers, cf. Tarski (1933) . However, this in effect
means that quantifiers are monsters (in Kaplan’s (1989b) terminology)—for discussion see
e.g. Rabern (2013). To indulge in a bit of Kaplan exegesis, it could be argued that Kaplan
could avoid this consequence by sharply distinguishing bound and unbound variables, i.e.
by assuming that the variables (pronouns) that are bound are simply different expressions
than the variables that are unbound (deictic pronouns). In various places, e.g. Afterthoughts
(1989a, 571ff), this appears to be Kaplan’s favoured view. Yet, in other places, e.g. Kaplan
(1989b, 541ff), bound and unbound variables are treated alike. Hence, it is not entirely clear
what Kaplan’s view is.
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refer to different individuals, even within one context, this is intuitively simply a
case of multiple uses of the same word. A single word means a single character, but
because of its variable nature (its context-sensitivity), different uses of this word
can be assigned different referents.26
Another reason to think that there is a difference between the context-sensitivity
of pronouns and lexical ambiguity is this: it would be entirely unsurprising and
unremarkable if some speaker S was competent with only one meaning of a lexically
ambiguous word. For example, S might know that ‘bat’ is used to talk about a piece
of sporting equipment, but not know that it is also used to talk about nocturnal
animals. In contrast, it would be surprising and quite remarkable if, say, the word
‘she’ was part of S’s vocabulary (i.e. suppose S used the word to refer to his mother),
yet S was unaware that it can be used to refer to different individuals. Indeed, one
might think that S, in this case, is just not competent with the meaning of ‘she’.
In contrast, in the previous case, it does seem that S is competent with one of the
meanings of ‘bat’.
2.2 Proper Names as Pronouns
My proposed analysis of referential proper names is now quite simple. It is simply
a variant of the analysis of pronouns above. Specifically, I propose that the lexical
entry for the referential variant of a name, e.g. ‘Paul’, is the following:
(25)
JPaulRi Kc,g,w = g(i) if g(i) is called Paul in wc
= undefined otherwise
According to this analysis, the name ‘Paul’ is essentially a pronoun. The referent
of the name depends on a (contextually determined) variable assignment which we
26Given that the semantic value of a pronoun is determined by a variable assignment,
this analysis requires that pronouns come equipped with indices, i.e. ‘she1’, ‘she2’ ... ‘shen’.
Moreover, each of these will need a separate lexical entry. But, if the lexicon contains ‘she1’,
‘she2’ ... ‘shen’, not only are we committed to a potential infinity of variables in the lexicon (an
objection often pressed by proponents of so-called variable-free semantics, cf. e.g. Jacobson
1999; 2000; 2014), this also looks technically indistinguishable from ambiguity. Someone might
therefore object to my claim that it is an advantage of my view that (spoiler alert) names are
context-sensitive (rather than lexically ambiguous) when my analysis essentially treats names
as a type of pronoun, i.e. as a numerically indexed variable.
This is an important but complex issue, so I will only make a brief comment here. First,
notice that the superscripts associated with e.g. ‘bat’ are merely intended to help distinguish
one homonym from another, i.e. these are not semantically interpretable. In contrast, the
index associated with a pronoun is semantically interpretable, indeed it is essential to its
semantic interpretation. Second, the semantic value of a pronoun is determined by a variable
assignment (which in turn is determined by context), whereas the semantic value of, say, ‘bat1’
is determined by the model. I take it that this difference is also meant to generally reflect that
the meaning of any given pronoun is sensitive to context in a way that e.g. ‘bat1’ is not. Much
more could, and have been, said about this issue, see e.g. Braun (1996), Gauker (2014), Dever
et al. (2014).
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may suppose informally represents speakers’ intentions. Hence the name can refer
to different individuals across different contexts. However, the name is constrained
in the sense that it can only refer to individuals who are called Paul. In other words,
the variable assignment g only returns an individual d for argument i if d is in the
domain of the function in (26).
(26) λx : x ∈ De and x is called Paul . x
This constraint on the assignment of semantic values to names can be thought
of as a way of cashing out (at least part of) the character of the name.27
This analysis retains the most important virtues of Millianism (as defined ear-
lier). First, a name is a singular term that refers directly and without the mediation
of any propositional constituent to its (intended) referent, viz. it is directly referen-
tial. Second, if a sentence S contains a name N that refers to b relative to context c,
then if the proposition expressed by S in c is evaluated relative to different possible
worlds, the referent of N is b at everyone of those possible worlds. Hence, names
are rigid. Third, since the referent of a proper name is controlled by a contextually
determined variable assignment, its reference can only be shifted by operators that
operate on variable assignments. Thus, it cannot be shifted by modal or temporal
operators, and so names are fixed.
This analysis of names does, however, diverge from Millianism in one respect,
namely in that it does not analyse names as individual-denoting constants. Remem-
ber, on the Millian view, it is assumed that e.g. Paul McCartney and Paul Newman
have different first names. While these first names happen to be homonyms, they
are nonetheless different: One is the first name of Paul McCartney, the other is the
first name of Paul Newman. Personally, I find this a particularly counterintuitive
consequence of Millianism and I am therefore more than happy to relinquish the
assumption that gives rise to it.28 It seems much more plausible that proper names
are simply context-sensitive expressions—expressions that can refer to different
individuals on different occasions of use. This is precisely what my proposed view
predicts. I.e. according to my view, McCartney and Newman have the same first
name, but that name can, on different occasions of use, be used to refer to either of
them.
In conclusion, the analysis of proper names as pronouns retains the best features
of Millianism and moreover provides the advantage of avoiding lexical ambiguity.
27Again, as mentioned earlier, we may need a more sophisticated naming constraint. I
remain agnostic on that question, but cf. footnote 20.
28For a more extensive discussion of the problems with the assumption that names are
lexically ambiguous, see e.g. the discussion in Katz (2001, 150-154)
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2.3 Meeting the Challenges to the Type-ambiguity View
The analysis of names as pronouns also provides a straightforward answer to the
challenges discussed in section 1.2. To see this, let’s start with Inferential Patterns
(E1). Given my proposed analysis, it is very simple to explain why the inferences in
IF1 and IF2 (and other related inferences) are intuitively compelling. For example,
consider again IF1 below.
Paul is tired
IF1
So, at least one Paul is tired
For the premise ‘Paul is tired’ to be true, the variable assignment must map the
index associated with the name ‘Paul’ to some individual a in the domain. However,
in order for the assignment function to return a (i.e. the individual associated with
the index), a must be called Paul—this is the semantic constraint associated with
the name. So, it follows that for the premise ‘Paul is tired’ to be true, there must be
(at least) one individual x in the context such that x is called Paul and x is tired. But
this is, of course, simply the truth condition of the conclusion of IF1. So, when the
premise is true at some context c, the conclusion is then also true at c—precisely as
desired. However, notice that this analysis does not render IF1 necessarily truth
preserving (and it should not), because the truth of the premise at some context c
is consistent with the possibility of there being possible worlds where the referent
determined by g(c) is not called Paul (and, so, where no Pauls are tired).29
In conclusion, this analysis captures one natural sense in which the inference
is correct without predicting that it is necessarily truth preserving. Moreover, the
explanation generalises straightforwardly to IF2 and other related inferences.
Before proceeding to the challenge in (E2), let me add a remark with respect to
Millianism: As noted earlier, it seems that Millians need an alternative explanation
of the intuitive acceptability of the inferences in IF1 and IF2. Moreover, it is not
29Given that the inference is not necessarily truth preserving, it is not valid in the sense of
being true at every world of every model. However, as argued by Montague (1968), Kaplan
(1989b) and others, a restricted notion of validity is needed in order to assess sentences
and arguments containing indexical terms (e.g. pronouns)—or what Montague (1968) called
‘pragmatic languages’. To this end, Kaplan (1989b) introduces the notion of indexical validity
where a sentence φ is defined as indexically valid iff it is true at every context of every model.
This definition combined with certain constraints on (the contexts of) of the model, namely
that a context must be ‘proper’, permits Kaplan’s account to predict that a sentence such as ‘I
am here now’ is valid (in this indexical sense)—yet not necessarily true. By analogy, if relevant
constraints were imposed on the models here (for example, if the only contexts considered
were contexts where any referent of ‘PaulR’ is in the extension of ‘PaulP’), my account would
also render IF1 valid in this indexical sense, without thereby predicting that it is necessarily
truth preserving, i.e. there would still be possible worlds where the referent of ‘PaulR’ is not
called Paul.
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entirely clear what that explanation is supposed to be. But, to further bolster the
case for my proposed analysis (and the explanation proposed above), consider the
inference in IF3 below.
He is tired
IF3
So, at least one male individual is tired
This inference looks parallel to IF1, i.e. it is intuitively an instance of perfectly
good reasoning, yet it is not necessarily truth preserving (i.e. there might be possible
worlds where the referent of ‘he’ in the context is not male).
One natural explanation of the intuitive correctness of this inference would now
be identical to the explanation for IF1, namely that the φ-features associated with
the pronoun constrains what that pronoun can be used to refer to. Consequently, if
‘He is tired’ is true in a context c, the pronoun must then refer to an individual who
is male in c. In short, the conclusion straightforwardly follows.
It is natural to assume that the referential terms in IF1 and IF3 have semantically
restricted uses, i.e. ‘Paul’ can only be used to refer to individuals called Paul whereas
‘he’ can only be used to refer to individuals who are male. These two assumptions
are what permit a straightforward explanation of the intuitive correctness of the
inferences. So, given the similarity between IF1 and IF3, it seems quite reasonable
to assume that they have similar explanations. Yet, if the Millian is correct, IF1 and
IF3 will likely have fundamentally different explanations: IF1 must be explained
without any assumptions about the meaning of the name, whereas the explanation
of IF3 would naturally rely on the pronoun’s semantic association with φ-features.
The question then is what reasons there are for assuming that these explanations
should be fundamentally different.
Next, Competence (E2). To account for the previous observations concerning
competence, notice two things: (a) pronouns also have predicative uses, i.e. uses
as count nouns, and (b) the observation about competence with respect to proper
names also extends to pronouns. For example, a speaker who is capable of un-
derstanding the use of ‘she’ in (27a) is also typically capable of understanding the
use of ‘she’ in (27b)—and mutatis mutandis for the sentences in (28a)–(28b) and
(29a)–(29b).
(27) a. My kitten, she loves music.
b. Oh, your kitten is a she?
(28) a. There’s one male and one female
snake in every cage.
b. I see. Is that the she?
(29) a. HE is a bit aggressive, but SHE is such a cute little monkey.
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b. I think you are confused. Both of my kittens are shes.30
What explains this observation? The best candidate explanation is intuitively
that competent speakers are capable, somehow, of drawing connections between (a)
the content of the φ-feature constraint associated with the pronoun (the restriction
on gender) and (b) the property expressed by the predicative use of the pronoun,
namely the property of being female. In short, the most plausible explanation is that
a speaker who understands that ‘she’ can refer only to female individuals somehow
infers that the relevant salient property with regards to predicative uses of ‘she’, i.e.
attributions of the form ‘is a she’, is the property of being female.31
Admittedly, this leaves an important question unaddressed, namely what it is,
i.e. what mechanism it is, that enables the hearer to draw these inferences? That is a
difficult question, but in all likelihood also a question whose answer should explain
similar observations about many other expressions, e.g. the examples below.
(30) a. I grabbed a bottle.
b. Could you bottle the wine?
(31) a. Is the book on the shelf?
b. Yes, I shelved the books earlier.
(32) a. Here’s some shampoo.
b. Great. I’ll shampoo Rex later.
(33) a. Did you see the ship?
b. No, I was shipping your gift.
If a speaker understands (30a), she also typically understands (30b) or at the
very least is capable of inferring its meaning. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for
the other pairs above. The general feature common to the examples in (30)–(33) is
that the emphasised expressions in the (b)-sentences are morphologically derived from
the emphasised expressions in the (a)-sentences and that their lexical categories are
changed in this process. A morphological derivation is, roughly speaking, a process
by which a derivational affix (so, a prefix, infix, or suffix) is added to an expression
resulting in a different expression having a distinct but related meaning. A simple
30An extensive list of examples of predicative uses of pronouns can be found in e.g. the
Oxford English Dictionary (3rd edition, September 2013).
31A referee for this journal raises a couple of worries for the parallel with pronouns. First,
unlike names, pronouns cannot occur NP-internally in English, cf. ‘*every she’, ‘*most shes’,
and ‘*three shes’. This is correct and it is not entirely clear to me why that is. It could be an
accidental feature of English since there are other languages with predicative uses of pronouns
that do allow NP-internal occurrences, e.g. Danish.
The referee also notes that it is only third person pronouns that permit these predicative uses.
Assuming that this is correct (which I do not think is obvious), there might be an explanation:
In English (and probably various other languages) only predicates whose meaning relates to
gender have been morphologically derived from pronouns. For example, to say that a cat is a
she is to say that it is female (not that it is neither the speaker nor the addressee or that it is a
singular individual). So, since only third person singular pronouns are marked for gender in
English, only these can be used as predicates.
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example is the morphological derivation of a plural count noun from a singular
count noun which normally requires only the addition of the suffix ‘-s’. However,
some morphological derivations produce no morphological changes and these are
standardly referred to as zero-derivations or conversions. As an example, consider the
derivation of the verb ‘to bottle’ from the common count noun ‘bottle’. As in the
examples in (30)–(33), this is also an example of a morphological derivation that
has the effect of altering the lexical category, viz. one derives a verb from a noun.
These kinds of processes, e.g. the process by which a noun is converted into a verb
(through morphological zero-derivations), are extremely common in English and
thus, in a technical term, said to be productive.32
In light of examples such as (30)–(33), it seems natural to draw the following
general conclusion: competent speakers are endowed with an ability to immediately
understand or infer the meaning of an unfamiliar expression if it is morphologically
derived from an already familiar expression. But, again, what would explain that
speakers have this ability with respect to morphologically derived words? The
only plausible explanation is essentially the explanation outlined above, namely
that the derived word shares some crucial component of meaning with the word
from which it was derived. Hence, the reason that a speaker will understand the
meaning of the verb ‘to bottle’ when the speaker is only antecedently competent
with the common count noun ‘bottle’ is that one is derived from the other. That is,
the meaning of the verb is essentially related to the meaning of the noun, and this
overlap in meaning is what enables understanding (and thus explains competence).
With regards to names, notice that their behaviour (intra- and cross-linguistically)
looks similar to the behaviour of pronouns. So, whatever explains the observation
about competence with respect to pronouns, that explanation could also potentially
explain the observation about names. In both cases (given my analysis of names),
there is a similar overlap in content between the referential terms and their predica-
tive counterparts, and it seems plausible that this is precisely what explains why
someone competent with the referential uses of ‘she’ or ‘Paul’ are also competent
with their respective predicative uses.
Finally, the worries about Intra- and Cross-Linguistic Uniformity (E3): First,
why are all names in English (and not merely some names) type-ambiguous? Con-
sider again the explanation of competence suggested above. That explanation
assumed that speakers are capable, somehow, of drawing inferences from (a) the
content of the ‘φ-features’ of a name (or pronoun), to (b) the property expressed
32The notion of productivity in linguistics is used to refer to grammatical (e.g. morphological)
processes that are preferred for new expressions. For example, in English, the suffix -ed is
the preferred morpheme for past tense even though there are alternatives. So, the process by
which the morpheme -ed is added to a verb to indicate past tense in English is productive. My
claim here is that with regards to both pronouns and names, there is a similar process (viz.
a conversion or a zero-derivation process) by which pronouns and names are converted into
predicates and that this process is productive not only in English but also in other languages.
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by the predicative use of that name (or pronoun). Therefore, a speaker who under-
stands that ‘Paul’ can refer only to individuals called Paul is capable of inferring that
the relevant property with regards to various constructions, for example determiner
phrases such as ‘some Paul’ or ‘both Pauls’, is the property of being called Paul. In
short, the predicative name is morphologically derived from the referential name.
If this explanation is correct, it is then completely unsurprising that the ambiguity
applies to names in general, because it would be inexplicably arbitrary if the ability
to draw such inferences was restricted to only some names.
Second, what would explain that the type-ambiguity is attested across such a
wide variety of other languages? Proponents of The–Predicativism often emphasise
the ubiquity of predicative uses of names across other languages, but it is rarely
noted that the languages where predicative uses of names are attested also often
exhibit important differences in their distribution, i.e. in the varieties of predicative
uses that are possible. To give just one simple example, while names can be used
predicatively in Scandinavian languages such as Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish,
the predicative uses are much more limited than in English. Names in these particu-
lar Scandinavian languages do not generally take plural morphemes and predicative
plural names are, as a result, almost invariably judged ungrammatical.
Moreover, in Danish, definiteness marking is achieved using either free-standing
articles (den, det) or suffixes (-en, -et). However, names in Danish cannot take any
of the definite suffixes, so names in Danish differ importantly from common count
nouns in that these generally accept definiteness marking using suffixes.33
So, what could explain these cross-linguistic differences? While one should be
careful about drawing general conclusions from what might be considered anecdo-
tal observations, suppose for the sake of argument that predicative names in English
are morphologically derived from referential names. That is, suppose that English
contains a count noun, ‘PaulP’ (lexical category NP) and that this has been derived
through a lexical category changing conversion from a referential expression, ‘PaulR’
(lexical category DP). Suppose further that the expression ‘PaulR’ has the semantics
given in (25). If this were the correct explanation of how predicative names come
into existence, i.e. via morphological zero-derivations, one should then expect to see
variations across various languages. For example, one should expect that languages
that are conservative with regards to, say, derivations that change lexical categories
might have fewer uses of predicative names compared to languages that are very
liberal with respect to such derivations. If so, it would make sense that a liberal
language such as English would permit plural uses of predicative names whereas a
less liberal language such as Danish might not. In other words, one might expect to
33There are interesting distributional facts about when common nouns take a free-standing
article versus a suffix, see e.g. Hankamer and Mikkelsen (2002) and Matushansky (2006) for
discussion, but that does not change my point here. Contrary to normal count nouns, names
in Danish never take definite suffixes ‘-en’ or ‘-et’.
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see differences that are in actual fact attested.
In contrast, suppose that names are uniformly predicative (as The–Predicativists
maintain). If so, should it not then seem surprising that there are languages where
such allegedly simple count nouns just cannot be pluralised. Why would that be
and what would explain it?34
The more general point is that predicative uses of names in other languages
(and variations across these languages) are compatible, and indeed expected, on
the specific type-ambiguity view defended here. Moreover, to suppose that names
are ambiguous in other languages is neither ad hoc nor unprincipled when one can
systematically explain how and why this ambiguity would have arisen. With type-
ambiguous expressions there is a very simple and plausible explanation, namely
that the ambiguity arises as a result of morphological zero-derivations. And if this
is correct, this provides a nice foundation for explaining facts about competence.
Hence, the best answer to the question ‘why is the ambiguity cross-linguistically
uniform?’ is that it is useful! Clearly, if a language has referential names, it would
most likely be useful for speakers of that language to also have a predicate that
expresses the property of being called that name. So, if the language is sufficiently
liberal with regards to derivations that change lexical categories (i.e. if those pro-
cesses are productive in a language), it is entirely unsurprising that predicative uses
are ubiquitous. Moreover, the same argument applies in the case of predicative uses
of pronouns (which are also attested in other languages, e.g. Danish, Norwegian,
Swedish).
2.4 Conclusion
If referential names are analysed as a species of pronoun, the standard objections to
the view that proper names are type-ambiguous are easily dismissed. Moreover,
34A referee for this journal challenges this explanation on the following grounds: Once the
lexical entry for a predicative name is established, it should not be subject to non-standard
constraints, e.g. a restriction against pluralisation. As a result, the lack of plural uses of
names in e.g. Danish is as much of a problem for my proposed view as for The–Predicativism.
This is a good point. My only very tentative response would be that the distributional facts
about plural predicative names seem more surprising if names are assumed to be uniformly
predicative. Whereas, if they are the result of some morphological derivation, I find it easier
to believe that various language internal rules might then kick in to block further derivations,
e.g. pluralisation. But, admittedly, this is not an entirely satisfying explanation.
Similarly, the referee also notes that if it assumed that there are predicative names, but
moreover that ‘the’ is never phonologically null (which I am assuming), an explanation is then
needed as to why descriptions such as ‘the Paul’ or ‘the Mary’ are infelicitous. Again, I do not
at present have a good explanation, but I am tempted to suggest that the reason is that there is
no need for such descriptions. Their obvious use is covered, so to speak, by the referential
names. Moreover, this seems to be a problem not just for me, i.e. the corresponding question
for the proponent of The–Predicativism would be why the determiner must be phonologically
null when occurring in front of name?
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there is a plausible and systematic explanation of the ambiguity available and this
explanation fits nicely with independent observations about e.g. pronouns. For
that reason, positing a type-ambiguity is neither ad hoc nor does it add gratuitous
theoretical complexity. Finally, because there are strong similarities between pro-
nouns and names, i.e. both have referential and predicative uses, are productive,
license various inferences, the proposal to analyse names as a type of pronoun is
justified and provides its own kind of theoretical unification. In other words, there
are compelling reasons for preferring the type-ambiguity view.
This now leaves us in the following dialectical situation: If referential names
are construed on the model of pronouns, the thesis that names are type-ambiguous
is strongly supported, principled, and thus perfectly feasible. However, the type-
ambiguity view does commit us to an ambiguity.35 However, since The–Predicativism
needs not posit an ambiguity in proper names, proponents of this view might insist
that this is a simpler view, and hence a theoretically more parsimonious view. That
would only be correct if The–Predicativism and the type-ambiguity view were equal
in all other respects. The remainder of this paper is devoted to demonstrating that
this is not the case. Indeed, proponents of The–Predicativism need to make several
problematic assumptions in order to adequately capture the meaning of referential
names.
3 The–Perils of The–Predicativism
Even if it is granted to the proponents of The–Predicativism that it is, ceteris paribus,
a theoretically simpler view, the problem for The–Predicativism is that it comes with
a number of additional costs. In short, all things are not equal between my version
of the type-ambiguity view and The–Predicativism.
3.1 Referential Names and Rigidity
The–Predicativists generally endorse the following three theses (or something very
close), cf. Fara (2015b, 97).
C1 ∣ Predicative Names
A name, for example the name ‘Paul’, is a multiply applicable predicate that
applies contingently to an individual only if that individual is called Paul.
C2 ∣ Covert Definite Determiners
When the name ‘Paul’ appears as a bare singular in argument position of a
predicate, the name is the sister of a covert and unpronounced definite article
‘the’.
35In the following sense: it requires an expansion of the lexicon—two separate lexical entries
for each name (just like there are two separate lexical entries for the verb ‘bottle’ its noun
counterpart).
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C3 ∣ One Definite Determiner
There is only one definite determiner ‘the’, however it can occur either overtly
or covertly (viz. pronounced or unpronounced).
Given these assumptions about the meaning of proper names, one immediate worry
is how proponents of The–Predicativism are going to capture the fact that referential
names are rigid and fixed. Since The–Predicativism assumes that referential names
are definite descriptions of the form ‘The N’ where N is an occurrence of that name
and since descriptions are not generally rigid, proponents of The–Predicativism
need some way of predicting that a certain class of definite descriptions are in fact
rigid, namely the descriptions where the argument of the definite determiner is a
name. The central question, of course, is how The–Predicativists are going to achieve
this result without simply making ad hoc provisions specifically for names.36 For
example, were one to assume that count nouns that are of the name-variety just
happen to give rise to rigidity when combined with a definite determiner, one would
need independent justification for that assumption. Without such independent
justification, it would simply be stipulative and thus not suffice as an explanation
for why names are rigid.
3.1.1 Elbourne (2005) and Matushansky (2008) on Rigidity
While Elbourne’s (2005) and Matushansky’s (2008) views are importantly different,
their analyses both assume that referential names are associated with some kind of
indexical or context-sensitive element. For example, Matushansky writes:
A possible account for the rigidity of proper names comes from the widespread
proposal that it results from indexicality, since indexicals such as I, now or here
are also known to denote the same individual across different possible worlds.
(Matushansky, 2008, 599)
Specifically, both analyses assume that when a proper name (i.e. a count noun)
is composed with a definite determiner, the resulting definite description contains a
variable whose semantic value is contextually determined. Where Elbourne’s and
Matushansky’s accounts differ is in their assumptions concerning the nature and
the structural location of this indexical element.
On Elbourne’s view, the LF associated with a bare singular occurrence of ‘Alfred’
in argument position of a predicate is (34)—where the definite determiner is unpro-
nounced. Given this LF, a variable assignment g, and assuming the presupposition
36One, it seems to me unexplored, possibility would be to consider so-called descriptions
that have grown capital letters, e.g. ‘the Holy Roman Empire’ or ‘the Space Needle’. These
exhibit paradigmatic name-like behaviour but seem syntactically a kin to definite descriptions.
Thus identifying the feature of these descriptions that make them behave like names could
potentially be a step in the right direction. For discussion (yet no answer to this particular
question), see Rabern (2015).
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of the description is satisfied, its semantic value will then be (35), cf. Elbourne (2005,
172-178).37
(34) [[THE 2] Alfred]
(35) ιx.[Alfred(x) ∧ x = g(2)]
Elbourne provides independent justification for the existence of the index i (i = 2
above), cf. (2005, 95-97, 112-115), which functions as an (additional) argument of the
definite determiner. However, Elbourne distinguishes three types of uses of definite
descriptions, namely bound uses (the uses that initially motivate associating an
index with the determiner), referential uses, and attributive uses.38 In cases where
the description is used attributively, the index is effectively vacuous (Elbourne uses
the number 0 for this type of case).
Given Elbourne’s analysis, a referential use of the description ‘the murderer’
expresses the following e-type content:
(36) J[[the 1] murderer]Kg = ιx.[murderer(x) and x = g(1)]
That is, relative to a variable assignment g, the semantic value of the description
is an individual, specifically the unique individual who is a murderer and identical
to g(1). The presupposition associated with the description will ensure that there is
such an individual (or the description will have no semantic value), and the identity
condition will then in turn ensure that the description is rigid—i.e. the individual
denoted by this description will be g(1) even when embedded under modal or
tense operators. In contrast, if the index 0 is in play, the description expresses the
following e-type content:
(37) J[[the 0] murderer]Kg = ιx.[murderer(x)]
The denotation of this description is also an individual, but its content does not
essentially involve a specific individual. This means, when used attributively (with
the vacuous index 0), the description is not rigid.
Given this analysis, Elbourne’s account is supposed to capture the rigidity of
proper names as follows: When a bare singular name occurs in argument position
of a predicate, it is simply a covert definite description whose index is unbound
and non-vacuous. In short, bare singular names in argument position of a predicate
(viz. referential names) are e-type expressions that contain a referential index which
fixes the referent. As a result, the referent will not shift across possible worlds, and
the descriptions are thus rigid.
37This is notation used by Elbourne (2005). Unlike Russell’s original use of the ι-notation,
the ι-expression is here a singular term referring to the unique individual x such that x is
called Alfred and x is identical to g(2).
38Roughly, referential and attributive in the sense proposed by Donnellan (1966).
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In contrast to Elbourne, Matushansky (2008, 599) proposes the following lexical
entry for the name ‘Alice’.
(38) JAliceK = λx: x ∈ De . λR ∈ D⟨e, ⟨n,t⟩⟩ . R(x)(/ælIs/)
In this lexical entry, the variable R ranges over naming conventions. The naming
convention is a relation between an individual (the individual named) and a phono-
logical string (the individuating criterium for a name). In constructions containing
a naming verb, the argument for the naming convention is supplied by the verb, cf.
Matushansky (2008, 594-595). Using this lexical entry for names, the explanation
for the rigidity of referential names is the following:
In order to account for the rigidity of proper names in argument positions I
propose to compare proper name predicates with relational nouns like friend
and adjectives like local and close, which may take a contextually supplied
indexical as an argument. [...]
Extending this analysis to proper names, we hypothesise that in argument
positions the naming convention argument slot is saturated by a free variable—
that of the naming convention in force between the speaker and the hearer, or
more strictly speaking, the naming convention of the speaker that is presupposed
to be shared by the hearer. This convention (I will indicate it as R0) is indexical
in the sense of being fully extensional: it contains no argument slot for a
possible world. As a result, proper names in argument positions will be rigid.
(Matushansky, 2008, 599)
So, the denotation of the name ‘Alice’ when occurring in argument position of a
predicate is the following:
(39) Jthe AliceK = ιx . R0(x)(/ælIs/)
where R0 is the naming convention in force between speaker and hearer in
the context of utterance.
The ι-expression in (39) is, again, an e-type expression (a referential term) that
can be informally read as ‘the unique individual x such that x is called /ælIs/ by the
contextually determined naming convention in force between the speaker and the
hearer’. Since R0 is a contextually determined naming convention, i.e. the value of
an indexical, the definite description refers only to the individual named /ælIs/ by
that specific naming convention. Since only one individual can be so-named by the
specific naming convention in play in the context of utterance, this entails that the
description ‘∅the Alice’ determines a specific individual that does not vary across
possible worlds. In short, the name is rigid.
It thus seems that both Elbourne’s and Matushansky’s accounts are perfectly
capable of capturing rigidity. So, what is the problem?
The problem is that both these accounts capture the rigidity of referential names
by relying on unjustified and ad hoc assumptions. For Elbourne, this is the assump-
tion that the index associated with the definite determiner is never (or very rarely)
Type-Ambiguous Names 27
vacuous (i.e. 0) when the count noun that composes with the determiner is a name.
Elbourne attempts to justify this assumption as follows:
[...] any use of a proper name in which the speaker does have some specific
person in mind and intends to refer to that person is ipso facto a use that
employs one of the nontrivial indices, and it is hard to construct circumstances
in which a speaker might use a proper name and not intend to refer to some
specific person they have in mind. They would have to be in a position to know
that that name was appropriate even though they know nothing about the
person that would enable them to refer to them, and this seems contradictory.
(Elbourne, 2005, 174)
However, this explanation seems to get things backwards. To observe that it is
difficult to use a name like one would use a description is just labelling the problem
that needs explaining. If bare singular names simply are covert descriptions, then
why would it be difficult to use such a name in the way that one would use a
description? For example, one can easily use a description such as ‘the murderer’
to refer to an individual where the only information available about the referent is
that he/she is a murderer. So, if names are count nouns on a par with ‘murderer’,
why should there be a difference with respect to names. This is the question that
needs to be addressed.
The general point is that for the predictions about the rigidity to come out as
desired, Elbourne must make special provisions for names, i.e. assume that names
are different from other count nouns which readily permit the 0 index. However, a
question then arises, namely how is this better than simply assuming that names
are (type) ambiguous? It simply is not. It is affording special status to names that
effectively set them apart from count nouns—and as far as theoretical parsimony is
concerned, this is equivalent to positing some kind of ambiguity.39
An analogous problem afflicts Matushansky’s explanation of rigidity. Remem-
ber, Matushansky assumes that when a name is in argument position of a predicate,
the naming convention is then ‘indexical in the sense of being fully extensional’ and
as a result ‘[...] names in argument positions will be rigid’ (2008, 599). The question
is what would justify this assumption? It is quite clear that when names occur in
other syntactic positions, making this assumption is not feasible. For example, when
a name is used predicatively, e.g. as the syntactic argument of a quantificational
determiner, this assumption leads to incorrect predictions. To illustrate, cf. (40).
(40) It’s possible that every Alfred is blonde.
39There is a sense in which it really just is ambiguity—it is simply ambiguity at the level
of the definite determiner. I.e. one could redescribe Elbourne’s view as follows: There are
two definite determiners, one which has an index that is sensitive to the variable assignment
and one with no index (or alternatively a void/null index which is thus not sensitive to the
variable assignment).
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(40) has a reading where, assuming a simplified semantics for modals, it is true
at a world w iff there is an accessible world w′ from w such that every individual
called Alfred at w′ is blonde. In other words, (40) has a reading where ‘every Alfred’
takes narrow scope relative to the modal. But capturing this requires that the
naming convention is not ‘fully extensional’ and can vary across possible worlds. If
it cannot, this then forces the equivalent of a wide scope reading of the determiner
phrase, namely a reading where (40) is true at w iff there is an accessible world w′
from w such that every individual called Alfred as a result of the naming convention
established in w is blonde.
This point could be extended to more or less any other determiner phrases, e.g.
‘some Alfred’, ‘most Alfreds’, ‘three Alfreds’ etc. In other words, when a name is the
syntactic argument of a determiner, the naming convention should not (invariably)
be a ‘fully extensional’ indexical whose value is determined by context. Indeed,
this point can even be extended to the definite determiner when this determiner
is combined with a modified name, e.g. ‘the Jack from Texas’. Such a definite
description will also exhibit variable narrow scope readings. However, it appears
that we should allow one special exception to this rule, namely when a (unmodified)
name is the direct syntactic argument of the (covert and unpronounced) determiner
‘the’, then it seems that the naming convention should be such a ‘fully extensional’
indexical. Why? Because referential names are rigid.
The problem with this explanation is basically analogous to the problem dis-
cussed above. For Matushansky’s account to make correct predictions, she must
assume that names are special. Specifically, names must be a type of count noun that
exhibits a very peculiar behaviour whenever composing with a definite determiner
(in argument position of a predicate). In such constructions, the naming convention
associated with the name somehow becomes an indexical whose value is deter-
mined by context and this ensures rigidity. But, again, how is this an improvement
over the assumption that names are ambiguous? In both cases, names are treated
not as simple count nouns, because in both cases names are assumed to differ from
count nouns in important respects.
In more general terms, the main point is this: If you propose a reductive analysis
where expressions of a certain type N (e.g. names) are argued to simply be instances
of a general category of expressions of type CN (e.g. count nouns), the onus is on
you to provide an explanation why the particular expressions in N seem to display
semantic behaviour that the other expressions in CN do not. If you attempt to
explain this non-standard semantic behaviour of the expressions in N by simply
assuming that these expressions have semantic properties that other expressions in
CN do not, this provides some justification for thinking that the reductive analysis
was perhaps wrong to begin with. Possibly, expressions of category N are just not
the same semantically as expressions of type CN. Certainly, if the main argument for
proposing a reductive analysis to begin with was overall theoretical simplicity— i.e.
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having one category of expressions is simpler than two—then the ad hoc assump-
tions needed to explain non-standard behaviour would seem to, at the very least,
cancel out whatever putative theoretical advantages that the increased simplicity
was supposed to provide.
A referee for this journal notes that Fara (2015b) rejects this kind of argument
on the grounds that even within the category of nouns, there are non-trivial distri-
butional differences.
If one is to maintain that mass terms are nouns despite their syntactic and
semantic differences from count nouns, then one should have an independent
criterion for being a noun and show that mass terms satisfy that criterion. [...]
Likewise, if one is to maintain that names are count nouns, then one should
have an independent criterion for being a count noun and show that names
satisfy that criterion. Things are better if we can also make some diagnostic
generalisations about the syntactic differences between names and common
count nouns. In the case of mass terms, we can make a number of syntactic
generalisations. Mass terms cannot complement the determiners ‘a’ or ‘every’;
they cannot occur in the plural; they cannot complement ‘how many’, but they
can complement ‘how much’.
We will see that ‘the’-predicativists can make correspondingly predictive
generalisations about names as compared with common count nouns.
(Fara, 2015b, 77-78)
Following (Sloat, 1969, 27), Fara observes that with respect to names and com-
mon count nouns, the distribution of determiners is basically identical. Indeed, it is
only with respect to ‘the’ that there seems to be differences, namely the following:
The tiger ate. *The Paul ate.
*Tiger ate. Paul ate.
Simplifying somewhat, Fara follows Sloat in assuming that the simplest ex-
planation for the distributional facts about ‘the’ is that it can occur covertly in
certain contexts. On the basis of an extensive analysis of the distribution of ‘the’
with names (where Sloat’s original chart is revised in important ways), Fara then
formulates a simple generalisation which is supposed to predict the distribution of
phonologically null occurrences of ‘the’. Facts about this distribution then serve as
evidence for the assumption that names are uniformly count nouns. That is, what
the distributional evidence suggests is that in cases where a name might seem to
be something other than a count noun, it is in fact the sister of an unpronounced
definite determiner.
Fara’s argument is rather elaborate, so I will not discuss it in detail here. How-
ever, let me just make two short observations. First, note that since this argument
relies extensively on the Sloat chart, i.e. observations about the distribution of de-
terminers in English, the argument is somewhat anglocentric. There are numerous
30 ANDERS J. SCHOUBYE
languages where the distribution of determiners with respect to names and com-
mon count nouns looks nothing like the Sloat chart, e.g. Scandinavian languages
such as Danish and Norwegian. The question is thus whether Fara’s argument for
names being uniformly count nouns will work when such languages are taken into
consideration. Second, even if Fara’s argument is correct, this fails to account for the
fact that whenever the definite determiner occurs as phonologically null (and hence
is the sister of a name), the resulting description must somehow be rigid. This must
be stipulated which is essentially what both Elbourne and Mathushansky do.
In fairness, Fara (2015b) seems aware of this problem and therefore attempts to
account for rigidity in an alternative way. This is discussed in the following section.
3.1.2 Fara (2015b) on Rigidity and Incomplete Descriptions
A better attempt at an explanatory account of the rigidity of proper names, assum-
ing that names are count nouns, is given by Fara (2015b). First, Fara points out
that bare singular names in argument position of a predicate are in fact (covert)
incomplete descriptions. This seems unobjectionable; since there is more than one
individual called Paul, a description of the form ‘∅the Paul’ which is semantically
equivalent to something along the lines of ‘the x such that x is called Paul’ fails to
determine a unique individual, and hence that description is incomplete. Second,
Fara conjectures that incomplete descriptions are rigid-in-a-context where this means
that the expression can refer to different things in different contexts, but is rigid
once context has fixed its semantic value. Consider, for example, (41).
(41) Olga enjoyed the party.
Fara writes:
If you were to sincerely utter [41] you would be talking about some one partic-
ular party—call it BASH—and saying of it that Olga enjoyed it. Suppose that
the utterance is true: that Olga did in fact enjoy BASH. Someone who overhears
your utterance of [41] might well not know what party you are talking about.
If he asks you, “what party are you talking about?” you might say, “Naomi’s
40th birthday party.” Or you might equally satisfyingly respond by saying
“the party I went to last night.” Since your aim is to enable your audience to
know which of the many parties that happened last night is the one that you are
talking about, it is appropriate to give any answer that will adequately convey
to your audience which party it is that you are talking about. Nothing in such
exchanges requires that there be some one particular completing description
that enters into the proposition expressed by your original utterance of [41].
When you use the incomplete description ‘the party’, you use it to talk about a
particular party, to say something about it—as opposed to whatever party is
the so-and-so (as Donnellan (1966) might have put it) where “is the so-and-so”
is supposed to stand in for some particular completing description recovered
from the context. (Fara, 2015b, 97-98)
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In the quotation above, Fara appears to be advocating the view that the se-
mantic value of the incomplete description ‘the party’ in (41) is simply the specific
party to which the speaker intended to refer. That is, one could interpret Fara as
here assuming that the only propositional contribution of the description is an
individual (so the description is effectively an individual constant). If so, this would
straightforwardly account for the purported rigidity of incomplete descriptions.40
Notice that if Fara is right, this would capture the rigidity of referential names
in a perfectly principled way. If incomplete descriptions are rigid, rigidity is then
simply a property of a certain subclass of descriptions—regardless of whether the
restrictor of that description is a name. This would be a significant improvement
over Elbourne and Matushansky.
3.1.3 Incompleteness, Scope, and Rigidity
Rather than accepting that incomplete definite descriptions are referential in the
sense described above, the standard alternative response is to maintain that these
descriptions are in fact, and contrary to immediate appearances, complete. For
example, one could argue that when e.g. (41) is asserted in a context, it expresses
something like (42).
(42) Olga enjoyed the party that I went to last night.
40Fara does, however, explicitly deny that she is committed to any particular way of captur-
ing the rigidity of incomplete descriptions:
[...] there is no onus on me to provide an explanation of how or why incomplete
descriptions are rigid designators. That is the right of the piggybacker. I don’t
have to take a stand, for example, on what the mechanism is that renders in-
complete definite descriptions rigid—on whether, for example, rigidity requires
a covert ‘actually’ operator or whether, alternatively, there is more than one
definite article [...] (Fara, 2015b, 102-103)
However, it is not entirely clear how, say, a covert actuality operator fits with what Fara says
in the quotation above. An actuality operator would make the description rigid, but it would
not generally solve any incompleteness issues. For example, a description such as ‘the x such
that x is actually called Paul’ would still fail to pick out a unique individual and hence still
be incomplete. In other words, unless the description is assumed to refer, as in directly refer,
to a particular individual (given that it is incomplete), a sentence containing that description
just does not seem to succeed in expressing a proposition. Having more than one definite
article could help resolve the incompleteness issue, but would also effectively amount to
adopting a semantic distinction between attributive and referential descriptions, which is not
exactly uncontroversial—for discussion see e.g. Neale (1990), Bach (2004), Schoubye (2012).
However, if Fara thinks that proper names are covert incomplete descriptions, explaining why
speakers actually succeed in expressing propositions when using names seems as important
as explaining why the names are rigid. Assuming that incomplete descriptions are directly
referential terms (which is what Strawson (1950) seemed to think) would help explain both,
and it is not clear what other account of rigidity could really work here.
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This type of proposed explanation, however, raises various questions, e.g. what
determines the expanded content of (41), i.e. the relative clause modifying ‘party’,
and what is the syntactic and semantic status of this expansion? Fara considers, and
in turn rejects, three proposed explanations for why incomplete descriptions are in
fact complete.
V1 ∣ DOMAIN RESTRICTIONS
Sentences can be evaluated in restricted domains which are determined by
the context. Hence, a sentence such as (41) might be evaluated relative to a
domain D where the only party in D is a party that I went to last night.
V2 ∣ ELLIPSIS
An incomplete description is elliptical for a richer and complete description.
V3 ∣ CONTEXTUAL COMPLETIONS
Common nouns, e.g. ‘party’, are equipped with a syntactically associated
variable that denotes a property. In context, this variable is assigned a value,
e.g. {x ∣ x is an event I attended last night}—and this property is then inter-
sected with the property denoted by the noun, e.g. {x ∣ x is a party}—yielding
the semantic value of the noun in context, viz. the set of things that are parties
and that I attended last night.
Fara immediately dismisses V1 because, as she points out, this analysis is unable
to deal with so-called ‘mixed-domain’ cases, e.g. (43).
(43) The dog got in a fight with another dog. McCawley (1979)
If the domain of (43) is restricted to just one dog (so as to guarantee that the def-
inite description in subject position refers), there is then no plausible interpretation
of the determiner phrase in object position, viz. ‘another dog’. Hence, the domain
restriction strategy fails.41
With regards to V2 and V3, Fara argues against both by considering the be-
haviour of incomplete descriptions in modal contexts. Compare (44) and (45). If
one assumes either the ellipsis view or the contextual completions view, then (44)
would, relative to some context, be truth conditionally equivalent to (45).
(44) Olga might have enjoyed the party.
(45) Olga might have enjoyed the party that I went to last night.
It is generally accepted that definite descriptions can take either narrow or wide
scope with respect to modal operators, so (45) should have two possible readings
(which, according to Fara it does), namely (45a) and (45b):
41Fara is quick to dismiss V1 but for reasons of space I cannot discuss the merits of this
view here. However, I will just mention that as long as one is willing to divide up the domain,
or alternatively introduce new domains or subdomains, there might be ways to deal with
‘mixed-domain’ cases. Thanks to Torfinn Huvenes for discussion here.
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(45) a. It might be that Olga enjoyed the party that I went to last night.
b. The party that I went to last night is an x such that it might be the case
that Olga enjoyed x.
But Fara maintains that (44), in contrast to (45), has only one reading, namely
the wide scope reading in (45b). On the basis of this claim, she concludes:
In other words, [44] has only the truth conditions that it would have if the in-
complete definite description were rigid. Since incomplete definite descriptions
such as ‘the table’ or ‘the party’ can be used to talk about different tables or
parties on different occasions, it is right to say that these definite descriptions
are rigid-in-a-context. (Fara, 2015b, 100)
In short, the rigidity of referential names, that is bare singular names in argu-
ment position of a predicate, is explained by the fact that when composed with a
covert and unpronounced definite determiner, the result is an incomplete definite
description—and such descriptions are rigid-in-a-context.
There are, in my view, several significant worries with Fara’s argument above.
First, while it might be granted that a wide scope reading of (44) is the most natural
reading, the conclusion that incomplete definite descriptions consistently take wide
scope is just false. This is very easily demonstrated by considering a simple variant
of (44). Suppose Olga comes home from a party and is looking particularly hung
over. You now say,
(46) Olga must have enjoyed the party!
You can clearly felicitously assert (46) without having any specific party in mind
nor referring to a specific party—after all, Olga might have had a range of parties
to choose from and you might not be aware which of these she decided to attend.
However, for that interpretation of your utterance to be available, the description
‘the party’ must take narrow scope with respect to the modal. In other words, on
this reading, the referent of ‘the party’ varies across the points of evaluation and so,
the description is non-rigid.
In short, even if the wide scope reading of (46) is strongly preferred, a semantic
analysis is adequate only if it has sufficient resources to predict that (46) also has a
narrow scope reading. Fara dismisses V2 and V3 by arguing that these approaches
wrongly predict that a sentence such as (46) has at least two readings, but this is a
reason to favor, rather than dismiss, these views. The problem for Fara, of course, is
that if incomplete descriptions have non-rigid readings (possibly because they are
not incomplete in context), it then remains an open question why, if the description
was substituted for a name, the name would only have a rigid reading. If names are
covert incomplete descriptions, they should behave like incomplete descriptions,
yet they do not.
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A closely related problem for Fara’s explanation of rigidity is the fact that many
incomplete descriptions are naturally used attributively. To illustrate, suppose Mary
asks her assistant to get a rental car. Mary says (47).
(47) The rental car should have four doors.42
The definite description in (47) is incomplete, but on its most natural reading, it
is not rigid. Indeed, Mary’s use of the description appears to be attributive since she
clearly has no particular car in mind. Moreover, it seems quite natural to interpret
Mary as having asserted a slightly more specific proposition, e.g. ‘the rental car
that you end up renting should have four doors’, or something along such lines. The
non-rigidity of the description in (47) seems to be a prima facie problem for Fara’s
claim that incomplete descriptions are rigid-in-a-context.
Fara attempts to dispel this worry by exploiting a distinction between role-type
and particularised descriptions due to Rothschild (2007). According to Rothschild, a
description is role-type if,
[...] it is part of the common ground that there is exactly one person (or one
salient person) satisfying the descriptive content across a range of relevant
metaphysically possible situations and that the satisfier sometimes varies from
situation to situation. Some examples of role-type descriptions are ‘the family
lawyer’, ‘the mayor’, ‘the president’, ‘the tallest pilot’, and ‘the director’. With
role-type descriptions, we usually know independently of the specific conversa-
tional situation that the descriptive content is satisfied uniquely across other
possible situations: It is part of general knowledge that cities generally have
one mayor, countries one president, and so on. (Rothschild, 2007, 75)
Hence, according to Fara, the reason that ‘the rental car’ in (47) is non-rigid is
that it is a role-type description. In asserting (47), a speaker is simply characterising
the properties that an object must have in order to play the relevant role.
The reason that ‘the rental car’ and ‘the party’ can be used non-rigidly [...] is that
they are being used as role-type descriptions that do not yet denote anything
at all; we are deciding which things are going to fill the role and are invoking
various criteria. (Fara, 2015b, 104)
However, if incomplete descriptions generally have (non-rigid) role-type uses,
then names should have role-type uses too. Indeed if Fara is correct that ‘incomplete
descriptions are rigid in just those environments in which a name would be’ (Fara,
2015b, 105), there should be no divergence in availability of role-type uses of names
and descriptions as long as the ‘environments’ in which these expressions occur are
analogous. In support of the claim that names have role-type uses, Fara provides
the following example.
42Fara (2015b) attributes this example to Kent Bach via personal communication.
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(48) Una should have been your first daughter. (As said to parents considering
whether to name their second daughter ‘Una’.)
According to Fara, the name ‘Una’ is here used as role-type just like the incom-
plete description ‘the rental car’ is in (47). I.e. the speaker is talking about the criteria
that must be satisfied in order to fill the relevant role of the covert description.
I must admit that I find (48) peculiar and bordering on infelicitous. However,
setting that judgment aside, identifying one odd example of a name that appears,
perhaps, to be used attributively and non-rigidly (viz. as a role-type description) is
insufficient. Why is this insufficient? Because one can straightforwardly construct
scenarios that are more clearly structurally analogous to (47) than (48), but where
the names simply cannot be interpreted non-rigidly, viz. as role-type. Given this, an
explanation is needed why names quite generally resist role-type interpretations in
environments where incomplete descriptions do not. Indeed, this should just not
be possible if, again, incomplete descriptions are rigid in just those environments in
which a name would be.
To demonstrate my point, consider again the context described earlier for (47).
There, the background context was structurally the following: the speaker is looking
for an x to play the role of F and then asserts that the F should be G. Now, consider
the following: Mary has a strange obsession with people who are called Paul and
therefore asks her assistant to invite someone who is called Paul to lunch. Mary
now utters (49) to her assistant.
(49) #Paul should have blond hair.
While it is possible, in some sense, to understand what Mary is trying to convey
by asserting (49), her use of the name is, at the very least, odd—i.e. the assertion is
bordering on infelicitous.43
One natural explanation is that Mary is not intending to refer to a specific
individual, yet the name can only be interpreted as such. So, in an environment such
as (49) where the background conditions are structurally analogous to the context
described for (47), i.e. the name is supposed to be role-type, it nevertheless resists
a role-type (non-rigid) reading. However, if the name in (49) is really shorthand
43With regards to (49), a referee for this journal raised two alternative examples that might
support The–Predicativism, namely the two below.
(R1) Today’s Paul should have blond hair.
(R2) Paul should always/never have blond hair.
However, as regards (R1), here the subject, ‘Today’s Paul’, is a definite description (basically,
the description ‘The Paul of today’). So, the name ‘Paul’ is functioning as a simple predicate
(just as ‘schedule’ is functioning as a predicate in ‘Today’s schedule’). As regards (R2), I must
confess that, contrary to the referee, I find this sentence odd/marked in the same way as (49).
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for the incomplete description ‘the Paul’, then (49) should not sound odd. After
all, why would it not be possible, as it was for (47), to interpret the incomplete
description ‘the Paul’ as being completed in context. In other words, why is it not
possible to interpret Mary as having asserted something along the lines of ‘the Paul
that you end up inviting should have blond hair’?
Finally, these so-called role-type uses of descriptions are extremely easy to come
by. For example, notice how easy it is to get non-rigid (and contextually completed)
readings of the descriptions below.
(50) [CONTEXT: Woman renting pony for a kids birthday]
The pony should have blond hair.
(51) [CONTEXT: Man buying fur for his wife and talking to store clerk]
The fur should have blond hair.
(52) [CONTEXT: Music video director looking for a girl to star in his video]
The girl should have blond hair.
In contrast, getting such role-type readings for names is extremely difficult, if
possible at all.
(53) [CONTEXT: Woman looking for a person called Barack Obama—say for a documen-
tary about having the same name as the president]
#Barack Obama should be no more than 55 years old.
It is hard to deny that there is a clear difference between incomplete descriptions
and proper names. Compare (53) to the literally completed description in (54).
(54) The Barack Obama for the documentary should be no more than 55 years
old.
It seems that implicit completions are not possible with a bare singular name yet
perfectly possible with incomplete descriptions. So, if ‘Barack Obama’ is shorthand
for ‘The Barack Obama’ why is an implicit completion similar to the one in (54) not
possible? Again, this difference in behaviour needs to be explained.
Summing up, the rigidity of names was to be explained by two assumptions,
namely (a) that incomplete descriptions are rigid and (b) that referential names
are a subset of the set of incomplete descriptions. However, it turns out that
incomplete descriptions are not always rigid (e.g. when they are used as role-type),
so Fara amends her thesis to say that incomplete descriptions are only rigid in
those environments in which a name would be. Yet, what the examples above
demonstrate is that this is simply false. In many environments where incomplete
descriptions have non-rigid readings, names do not.
A second, though less pressing, concern is that it is somewhat unsatisfying to
be told that incomplete descriptions (which were supposed to explain the rigidity
Type-Ambiguous Names 37
of names) are rigid in just those environments that names are—without then being
told in which environments names are rigid.
3.2 Bare Singular Names vs. Incomplete Descriptions
This leads me to consider a few of other general problems that proponents of The–
Predicativism (of all stripes) need to address. If names are count nouns which in an
argument position of a predicate are composed with a covert and unpronounced
definite determiner, the result (as Fara rightly observes) is an (incomplete) definite
description. If this is the correct analysis of bare singular names in argument
position of a predicate (i.e. referential names), one should expect the behaviour of
such names to mimic the behaviour of incomplete descriptions in similar syntactic
environments. I argued above, that with respect to rigidity, they do not behave the
same. However, to make matters worse, there are other dramatic respects in which
their behaviours differ.
3.2.1 One-anaphora
The restrictor of an incomplete definite description can serve as an anaphoric anchor
in cases involving so-called one-anaphors.44 For example.
(55) I left the duvet outside, but there is another one upstairs.
We need not concern ourselves with the question regarding the correct analysis
of one-anaphora, i.e. whether these kinds of occurrences of ‘one’ should be analysed
as pro-forms, ‘dummy nouns’, or perhaps instances of noun phrase ellipsis.45 I
introduce this kind of example only to demonstrate that as long as the restrictor of
the incomplete description in the first conjunct is a count noun, the noun can then
serve as anaphoric anchor for a one-anaphor.
Given the assumption that names are count nouns, one would think that
names should then also be capable of serving as anaphoric anchors. However,
one-anaphora does not seem to be licensed if its antecedent is a name, cf. (56).
(56) # I left Paul outside, but there is another one upstairs.
(56) is straightforwardly infelicitous. It is just not possible to resolve the meaning
of ‘one’ and the most natural reaction to (56) would be to respond ‘another WHAT is
upstairs?’
44This observation is due to King (2006, 148-149). King’s discussion focuses on the problem
as it relates to That–Predicativism, but it carries over more or less directly to The–Predicativism.
No proponent of The–Predicativism has to my knowledge responded to this issue which is
why I think it deserves to be mentioned again. Thanks to Paolo Santorio for bringing this type
of example to my attention.
45For discussion of this issue, see e.g. Llombart-Huesca (2002).
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One could argue that (56) sounds odd because no contextual setup is provided.
I.e. the argument would be that when sentences such as (56) are asserted out of the
blue, they just sound odd. The first thing to notice about this response is that (55)
sounded fine yet no contextual setup was provided for that sentence. However, in
order to accommodate this worry about the lack of a contextual setup, consider the
following.
Ann is meeting Jack at a restaurant. Since Ann has a strange obsession with
men who are called Paul, Jack has promised to bring his friend Paul. However,
as Jack pulls up to the restaurant, he notices that another one of his friends,
also called Paul, is sitting in the upstairs section of the restaurant. He decides
right then and there to leave the Paul sitting next to him in the car, and instead
introduce Ann to the Paul who is eating upstairs. As Jack enters the restaurant,
Ann greets him, and Jack then says:
(57) # I left Paul in the car, but there is another one upstairs.
Even with this highly elaborate setup, purposely designed to license anaphoric
one, the sentence still seems infelicitous—it remains a clear contrast to any standard
occurrence of one–anaphora. So, the problem for proponents of The–Predicativism
is that if names are count nouns, then some non-stipulative explanation is now
needed as to why names cannot function as anchors for one-anaphors, and it is far
from clear what that explanation would be. Of course, if referential names are e-type
expressions (e.g. variables), one straightforwardly predicts that names should not
license one-anaphora.46
3.2.2 Attributively Distributed Descriptions
Another general problem for The–Predicativism is what I will refer to as attributively
distributed descriptions. What I have in mind here are cases where an incomplete de-
scription occurs in the scope of some determiner phrase, but where that determiner,
loosely speaking, is binding a variable associated with the description. This has
the effect of neutralising the incompleteness associated with the description. For
example, consider the cases below—focus on the descriptions in boldface.
(58) Sadly, every university professor in the country made the dean grade the
classes.
46A referee for this journal remarks in defence of The–Predicativism that not all count nouns
lend themselves immediately to one-anaphora. For example, ‘I left the cat outside, but there is
another one upstairs’ sounds quite odd. However, I think this is essentially an example of
lacking contextual setup. To see this, note that it only takes a minimal amount of contextual
setup for this sentence to sound perfectly felicitous. Just imagine that it is uttered in a context
where someone needs a photo with a cat (any cat) in the background. In other words, despite
nouns like ‘cat’, names seem resistant to one-anaphora in ways that count nouns generally do
not.
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(59) After this national scandal, at least one student at every school in the country
filed a complaint with the student support officer.
On the most natural readings of (58)–(59), the incomplete descriptions (in bold)
are used attributively and hence are neither directly referential nor rigid. Notice
that to appropriately assert either (58) or (59) the speaker need not be acquainted
with any of the possible denotations. The meanings of (58) and (59) can be more or
less accurately paraphrased as follows.47
(60) Sadly, [every university professor x in the country] made [the dean of x]
(the dean at x’s university) grade the classes.
(61) After this national scandal, at least one student at [every school in the
country y] filed a complaint with [the student support officer at y].
These descriptions are incomplete, but have very natural narrow scope readings
where their denotations vary with a preceding quantifier. Since these are perfectly
standard uses of incomplete descriptions, then if bare singular names are in fact
covert incomplete descriptions, we should expect such occurrences of names to
have attributively distributed uses too. So, let’s see what happens if the incomplete
descriptions in (58) and (59) are substituted for bare singular names.
(62) Sadly, every professor in the country made Jack grade the exam.
(63) After this national scandal, at least one student at every school in the country
filed a complaint with Jack.
The difference here is striking. The name ‘Jack’ has only a referential interpreta-
tion in (62)–(63). Now, granted, one might attempt to explain this by noting that
there is also a crucial disanalogy between (58)–(59) and (62)–(63): To interpret the
description in e.g. (59) as attributively distributed, it must be common ground that
every school has exactly one student support officer, i.e. this must be antecedently
established (or accommodated in context) in order for the co-varying interpretation
of the description to be available. And since it is not common ground that there is
precisely one individual called Jack at every school, the incomplete description in
(63) simply cannot be interpreted as attributively distributed. Because of this, it is
interpreted referentially (or so the argument would go).
But again, this explanation is inadequate which can be demonstrated by consid-
ering what happens if we tweak the cases to avoid this issue. So, suppose for the
sake of argument that there is exactly one individual called Jack at every school in
the country—now consider (64).
47How to compositionally predict these meanings is a difficult question, but we need not be
concerned with that here. Also, these are not simply cases of ‘bound’ definite descriptions. I
discuss this issue in the next section.
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(64) After this national scandal, at least one student at every school in the country
filed a complaint with Jack.
This does not seem to help. There is no reading of the name ‘Jack’ in (64) where
it is attributively distributed even when it is common ground (assumed to be true)
that there is a unique individual called Jack at every school. So, the missing common
ground information cannot be the whole explanation.
Finally, to conclusively demonstrate that this really is due to a difference between
proper names and incomplete descriptions, observe what happens when the name
‘Jack’ is substituted for its alleged semantic correlate. Again, suppose that there is
exactly one individual called Jack at every school in the country:
(65) After this national scandal, at least one student at every school in the country
filed a complaint with the person called Jack.
Here, the description ‘the person called Jack’ is easily interpreted as attributively
distributed—and this sharply contrasts (64). If, as proponents of The–Predicativism
maintain, these sentences, (64) and (65), are truth conditionally identical, viz. identi-
cal in meaning, there should be no differences in their possible interpretations, yet
there clearly is.
This is just another way of making the point that referential names behave in
ways that are quite dissimilar from incomplete definite descriptions, and for that
reason it seems highly doubtful that an analysis which treats referential names as
covert incomplete descriptions could be correct. In short, it seems highly doubtful
that any analysis along the lines of The–Predicativism could be right.
3.2.3 A Quick Remark on Names and Binding
There are multiple examples in the literature designed to demonstrate that names
have bound (or co-varying) readings. So, just like the description in (66) appears to
be bound (in the sense that its meaning co-varies with a preceding quantified NP),
so do the names in (67) and (68).
(66) If Carlos meets a scientist and decides to marry her, then his current wife
will stalk the scientist and try to kill her. Fara (2015b, 105)
(67) If a child is christened ‘Bambi’, and Disney Inc. hear about it, then they will
sue Bambi’s parents. (Geurts, 1997, 321)
(68) If John insists on calling his next son Gerontius, then his wife will be annoyed
and Gerontius will get made fun of because of his name. (Elbourne, 2005, 182)
It is important to emphasize that the observation that names have bound read-
ings has no direct bearing on the arguments above. What the previous argument
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demonstrates is that there is a clear difference between the behaviour of a name
‘Jack’ and its supposed semantic correlate ‘the Jack’ or ‘the person called Jack’. There
should not be such a difference if The–Predicativism was correct.
Finally, regarding binding of proper names more generally: This is obviously a
complicated issue where the data, in my view, is less than clear. However, notice
that an account that analyzes names as variables (i.e. pronouns) has resources to
capture bound readings, see for example Dever (1998) and Cumming (2008).48 In
contrast, an analysis which treats names as constants, e.g. Millianism, does not.
However, such resources do not come for free, because once the theory licenses
binding of names, adequate binding constraints will then need to be formulated
and justified. Since names show different binding behaviour than pronouns (i.e.
names are generally less susceptible to binding), proponents of the view that I am
defending here will need to provide some kind of explanation of this behaviour of
names as opposed to pronouns.
An entire paper could easily be devoted to a discussion of this issue, and for
reasons of space, I am unable to engage in that discussion here. However, let me
make two quick remarks on this issue. First, the extent to which pronouns can be
bound varies quite dramatically across the standard category of pronouns. For
example, it seems that third person pronouns are much more susceptible to binding
than, say, first person pronouns.
Second, this problem is equally a problem for proponents of The–Predicativism
since they assume that bare singular names in argument position are (covert) defi-
nite descriptions. However, definite descriptions are sometimes bound, but names
are less susceptible to binding than definite descriptions, so The–Predicativists are
going to need an adequate explanation of this divergence in behaviour too.
4 Conclusion
In conclusion, when names are analysed as type-ambiguous between predicates
and pronouns, the resulting analysis has the following advantages:
▸ It retains the virtues of Millianism, but provides the additional advantage
that referential names are not lexically ambiguous.▸ It preserves a strong content relation between predicative names and refer-
ential names. This relation in content provides a principled explanation of
the inferential connections between predicative and referential names, the
productivity of names, and intra- and cross-linguistic uniformity.
48Although, these resources would have to be supplemented with a syntactic and semantic
system which licenses non-standard binding relations, e.g. binding without c-commanding,
binding across sentences, etc.—in short, a dynamic semantics.
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▸ It provides a neat explanation of the close similarities between pronouns and
names.▸ It requires no additional ad hoc assumptions to capture they key properties
of referential names and also has no problems with the fact that descriptions
do not behave like referential names.
In short, names are type-ambiguous between variables and predicates. Names are
not uniformly predicates and names are not uniformly referential terms.49
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